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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
An action to set aside a termination of joint tenancy. 
DISPOSITION L~ LOWER COURT 
When respondent filed for divorce, his wife, Betty Nelson, 
who '"as appellant's mother, terminated t21e joint tenancy on the 
home owned by ner and respondent. On the death of Betty Nelson, 
before a decree of divorce had been entered, Mr. Nelson brought 
this ac~ion against appellant who is executrix of her mother's 
estate, to have the termination of joint tenancy set aside, and 
Judge Sawaya granted respondent such relief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT O:-< ."'.PPEAL 
Reversal of Judge Sawaya's order, reinstating as valid and 
effective Mrs. Nelson's termination of the joint tenancy. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
T21e parties married on March ll, 1976. 
by prior marriages, each having been Wldowed. 
Each had children 
Mrs. Nelson had a chlld, Michelle Davis, born March 7, 1955, 
as lssue of her marriage to her deceased husband. Subsequently, 
she remarried, havlng a chlld by her second marriage, Monique 
Skinner, born Februar:/ 26, 1962. That marriage ended in divorce. 
Mrs. Nelson and her children were Australlan. Mrs. Nelson 
immigr3ted to the L'nlted States ln late 1975. On arrival in Utah, 
-]-
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she bought a horne occupied by herself and her daughters. She sold 
this horne on her marriage to Mr. Nelson, and he made her a joint 
tenant on his horne in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
She was 50 years of age at the time of her marriage to Mr. 
Nelson. 
Mr. Nelson's first wife died of a stroke in 1975. 
Betty Nelson died of cancer on May 24, 1977. 
~----· 
References in this brief to the parties refer to appellant 
as Mrs. Nelson and and respondent as Mr. Nelson, as appellant's 
interest in the case is solely as executor of her mother's estate, 
and the matters in issue were between Douglas and Betty Nelson. 
The parties resided together continuously from the date of 
their marriage until the end of September, 1~6. 
~.0 __._ 
Mrs. Nelson had been in robust health, had taken a vacation 
with Mr. Nelson to California in June, but then rapidly became ver; 
ill. On being hospitalized in September, 1976, surgery was perforJ! 
and a number of inoperable cancers were discovered in her abdomina: 
area. 
The entire domestic file was received in evidence as an exh1· 
bit. (T 106, L 5-8) The domestic file, case D-24033, Salt Lake 
County District Court, is included under separate cover in the 
record on appeal designated as Supplemental Index (SI) The medl-
cal report on her condition is included. (SI 189-190) 
Mr. Nelson moved out of the home. By complaint dated Septem· 
ber 28, 1976, and filed October 4, 1976, he sought annulment based 
-2-
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on fraud, or alternatively, divorce. During the number of hearings 
that followed in the domestic case, he did not pursue the matter of 
annulment nor profer proof on fraud. 
Mrs. Nelson's cancer progressed so rapidly that, by the time 
the case was ready for trial, she was bedridden and so ill that the 
case couldn't be tried. 
Her older daughter, Michelle, had a job in Salt Lake City, 
and resided out of the parties' horne, but on Mr. Nelson moving out, 
Michelle moved into the horne and remained there until her mother's 
death, caring for her mother. The then 14 year old child, Monique, 
resided with her mother and Mr. Nelson through their marriage. 
Because the case was never tried, there is no adjudication 
as to the merits of the parties' domestic claims and financial posi-
tions. For that reason, this brief will incorporate the appropriate 
allegations from the complaint of Mr. Nelson and the counterclaim 
of Mrs. Nelson to set forth their positions. 
COMPLAINT 
"4. That the defendant, in order to induce the plaintiff 
to ~arry her represented to him that she would maintain 
a normal relationship as a wife with the plaintiff, would 
treat him with love and affectlon, and would give him the 
respect that a husband would expect of a wife all of which 
was done for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to marry 
the defendant. Sald representations were false when made 
and were known bv the defendant to be false when made, 
and were made to. the plaintiff for the purpose of inducing 
the plaintiff into marrying the defendant. Based upon said 
misrepresentations the plaintiff entered into the marital 
relatlonship with the defendant, and based further upon 
said representations said marriage should be annuled, and 
each party placed back lnto the position they were in prior 
to the tlme of said marrlage." (SI 165-166) 
- -:;_ 
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"6. That prior to the marriage of the parties the plain-
tiff was the owner of a home located at 3061 Canyon View 
Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, and had for many years prior 
thereto lived in said residence with his first wife, who, 
prior to the marriage of the plaintiff and defendant 
passed away after having suffered a stroke." (SI 166) 
"8. That the defendant has funds of her own and is cap-
able of supporting herself, and due to the short duration 
of the marriage between the parties, the plaintiff should 
not be required to pay the defendant anything by way of 
support with the exception of the sum of $100.00 per month 
for a period of three months commencing October 1, 1976, 
and ceasing with the last month of payment being required 
in December, 1976." (SI 166) 
"10. That the plaintiff has purchased some items of house-
hold effect at the insistance of the defendant during the 
marriage, and said effects have been purchased with the 
funds of the plaintiff, and should be awarded to the plain-
tiff along with all of the property he owned prior to the 
marriage including, real, personal,or mixed property of 
whatever kind and nature and wherever located." (SI 167) 
"WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against the defendant 
either annuling the marriage and declaring same void, or 
in the alternative that the Court does not find sufficient 
grounds for an annulment that the plaintiff be awarded 
a Decree of Divorce from the defendant divorcing the plain-
tiff from the defendant and disolving the bonds of matri-
mony, and awarding to the plaintiff his horne located at 
3061 Canyon View Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, and any and 
all personal property, real property, or mixed property 
of whatever kind or wheresoever located that the plaintiff 
owned prior to his marriage of short duration to the defen-
dant, or purchased by the plaintiff during his short mar~i­
age with the defendant, with the defendant to oe awarded 
the property that she owned prior to the marriage and 
brought into the marriage with her, with each party to 
assume, pay, and hold the other party harmless from any 
and all obligations on the property awarded to the respec-
tive parties, and for an Order of the Court requlring the 
defendant to vacate the horne of the plaintlff located at 
3061 Canyon View Circle, Salt Lake City, utah not later 
than the first day of December, 1976, and that each partY 
be awarded their automobile that they owned p~ior to their 
marriage and brought into the marriage with them, and for 
such other and further relief as to the court seems just 
and equitable in the premises. 
"DATED this 28th day of September, 1976." (SI 167-168) 
-4-
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ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
"2. Plaintiff has treated defendant cruelly causing her 
great mental and physical suffering and distress by refus-
ing to live with her, provide for her or care for her since 
discovery of, and treatment for an inoperable condition of 
cancer of her internal organs, and has treated her cruelly 
in other ways. 
"3. In latesurnrner, defendant was hospitalized at the LDS 
Hospital, her cancer was then diagnosed for the first time 
and she was operated on, the operation being a colostomy. 
She is now receiving regular chemotherapy and is not physi-
cally capable of working for wages. 
"4. Defendant resides with her two daughters, Michelle, age 
21, and Monique, age 14. She and her daughters carne to 
the United States 14 months ago from Australia, their 
native land. In connection with marrying plaintiff, de-
fendant gave up a widow's pension of $247.00 from the 
Australian government. She has made inquiry to see if 
it can be reinstated, and has not yet received a reply. 
"5. Defendant was purchasing home which she sold at a loss 
to her of approximately $3,000.00 and moved into plaintiff's 
home at the time of their marriage, all on plaintiff's in-
sistence. She had $1,400.00 in savings all of which have 
been spent by her on joint bills of the marriage and a 
California vacation for plaintiff and defendant in June, 
1976. She also sold her stove and bedroom furniture at 
plaintiff's insistence, giving him the proceeds. Defendant 
is presently without funds, or a place to live other than 
the home occupied by plaintiff at the time of their marriage, 
which he has conveyed into their joint names. 
"6. Defendant had health insurance on herself and her 
daughters which she gave up at plaintiff's insistence on 
their marriage, thereafter and presently being covered by 
plaintiff's insurance he being an employee of an insurance 
company. 
"WHEREFORE defendant prays judgment as follows: 
"1. For a Decree of separate maintenance, or as a secondary 
alternative, for a Decree of Divorce at such time as is 
appropriate. 
"2. For an immediate Order of court allocating obligations 
of the ~arties, allowing defendant temporary and permanent 
-5-
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support and alimony, allowing defendant use of the home 
at 3061 Canyon View Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, with 
the plaintiff being restrained from entering onto.such 
premises or its real property without express ~nv~tat~on, 
for her temporary and final costs and fees here~n, re- . 
quiring plaintiff to maintain fully all insurance.on wh~ch 
defendant is beneficiary, or life insurance on wh~ch he 1s 
principal. 
"3. For such other relief as the court may deem proper. 
"DATED October 15, 1976." (SI 169-170) 
Because Mrs. Nelson is deceased, it should be noted that s~e 
verified the content of her Answer and Counterclaim. (SI 170-1711 
Before marrying Mr. Nelson, Betty Nelson had employment anc 
health insurance. Mr. Nelson is an insurance executive and addec 
her to his existing health insurance when they married. As a res .. 
of her marriage, Mrs. Nelson had neither employment nor health 
insurance other than that provided through Mr. Nelson •.vhen he fl:;: 
for divorce. 
The treatment of cancer can reasonably be expected to be ~x-
pensive. As Mr. Nelson's complaint did not offer to conti~ue he2: 
insurance for Mrs. Nelson to meet her future cancer related meci::; 
expense, offered only $100 a month for three months, sought to~~ 
her out of the home and terminate her interest in the home, and 
the income from the Australian government to ~rs. Nelson as mo~ 2 : 
of the 14 year old daughter, Monique, had terminated, Mrs. Nelsc~ 
was in a position of financial distress. 
Mrs. Nelson filed a Motion for an Order Pendente L~te wh:c~ 
came on for hearing on October 2 2, 19 76, be fore c!udge Dean E. Co~.: 
At that hearing, Mrs. Nelson's f1nanc1al ?roble:ns ·h·ere :;-~':: Gefor2 
-6-
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Judge Conder. Mr. Nelson, on his part, through his attorney Wendell 
Bennett, presented a strong argument that it was hard on him to 
lose half equity in his home because his wife became terminally 
ill after a short marriage. 
Having ~onsidered the matter, Judge Conder entered his Order 
Pendente Lite allowing Mrs. Nelson to stay in the home, requiring 
Mr. Nelson to make payments on the home, and utilities, pay Mrs. 
Nelson a living allowance of $150 per month, and to keep her in-
sured. (SI 179; Minute Order at SI 175) 
This order was not signed by Judge Conder until November 4, 
1976. Reason for th~s delay is explained in the letter dated 
November l, 1976, from Mrs. Nelson's attorney, Samuel King, to 
Mr. :Jelson's attorney, \vendell Bennett. Judge Conder made this 
letter a part of the court file. The letter stated: 
"::lear Wendell: 
"In view of the fact that you haven't responded to my 
letters inviting negotiation nor approved nor commented 
on the proposed Order for signature by Judge Conder, I 
have no choice in order to orotect the financial security 
of Mrs. ::Jelson and her estate, tJ:!qn__ tQ.__terminate the joint 
tenancy and have her deed her interes_t in the prope_rty to 
her adult child, Michelle. This is now being done ai1d will 
be recorded during the week. 
"Sincerely," (SI 226) 
On ::Jovember 3, 19 76, '1rs. :Jelson sJ.gned the termination. It 
·.vas recorded :Jovember 4, 19 76. The termination provided: 
"NOTICE OF TERMI:JATION OF JOINT TE::JA.t'JCY 
"BETTY 'l. :/ELSON, nereby gJ.ves notice that she terminates 
the joint~nancy between herself and Douglas A. Nelson, 
such JOlnt ~nanc'j oeJ.ng re:lected and established by Quit 
-7-
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Claim Deed dated May 13, 1976, and recorded May 14, 
1976, in the Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, 
entry #2814353, and relating to the real property 
in Salt Lake County, Utah, described as: 
'Lot 7, Canyon View Circle, according to the official 
plat thereof.' 
"DATED November 3rd, 1976. 
/s/ Betty N. Nelson" 
On receiving Mr. King's November 1, 1976, letter, !1r. Benne: 
contacted Mr. King and asked him to review the matter wiG~ Judge 
Conder when the written order covering the October 22, 1976, hear· 
ing was submitted. Mr. King did this with Mr. Bennett being con-
tacted and advised from chambers. 
Judge Conder,being fully aware of the parties' positions, 
signed the order and added beneath his signature: 
"Defendant may convert the joint tenancy to tenancy in 
common. Property cannot be conveyed to any third party. 
D.C." (SI 179) 
To clarify exactly the effect of this Order, counsel a9pea~ 
without pleadings in Judge Conder's chambers on November 5, 1976. 
At that time, Judge Conder affirmed his order that "Defendant :na:· 
convert the joint tenancy to tenancy in common," and stated: 
"This order is entered to clarify the record. The basis 
on which the court entered its order of November 5, 1376 
[sic, the actual date was November .J, 1976], was as 
follows: 
"The parties are restrained from dispos1:1g of assets wn1~e 
the case is pending. Defendant, however, has the r1ght to 
ter~inate the joint tenancy and create a tenancy 1 commo~. 
but is restrained from conveylng ner 1nterest 1n t e sa1d 
property until further Order of the Court." lSI 1 2, 183, 
-a-
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Mrs. Nelson's document terminating the joint tenancy was 
recorded November 4, 1976, by her counsel after leaving Judge 
Conder's chambers. The Quit Claim Deed that she executed at the 
same time as the termination was held by counsel pursuant to the 
instruction of Judge Conder. It was recorded June 3, 1977, after 
~s. Nelson's death. 
On January 27, 1977, ~s. Nelson filed a Motion for Leave 
to Record Deed. The medical report ind1cated that she might die 
any day. (SI 189,190) The purpose of the motion was to allow 
con•Jeyance of the property to t.'"le daughter, ~ichelle, so as to 
avo1d the cost and time that m1ght be involved 1~ praba~~. with 
~lchelle JOini:1g ln t.'1e mot1on stating that she •,.;ould no"': convey 
:.he property unt.:..l a.fter her mot.'1er' s death, :..:1 the e•Jent that Mrs. 
:1elson should have a rem1ss1on and be a.ble ::o appear for hearing 
of the d1 'JOrce. (SI 186-138) 
Judge Davld K. Winder heard the mot1on and entered a Memor-
andum :)ecision (SI 2')7,208) ar.d Order (SI 209). In his decision 
and order, Judge '•'ilnder den1ed lea•;e to record the dee9, re_cog-
~:..zed the legally bi:1d1ng effect of the Termi~ation of Joint 
~enancy statl~g: 
. The court fee!s no further transfer of the property 
:r~n ~~e 0la.~~t~:: cr je£enda~t s~oG:d be ~ade. In 
deny1ng t;e defendant's ~ot:..on, the court is certainly not 
unm1ndf~l of the defendant's legltlmate 1nterest 1n a.ttempt-
l:1g tc 3'/0.J..d p:-cba:.-2 a:-:d ct.~er- probler.ls by tJrese:1t trans-
fer ~o ~er adul~ da.~;~~e~ =~ ~hateve~ ~nterest she ~as in 
the 306! Canyon ~1ew C1rcle property, and prior to her 
jea:.:-:., ·.·l.--:.:.-.::: a ;>23:-.s .:.:-7\...~.:..:-:er.:., bu~ ":.:-:e -:curt feels that 
unt.:..l all ~att ~s are resc:ved, .:.t ~culd te premature to 
~r3.:;s:e:- 3.:-:·.· ,:, :..--:-= J.sse:_.s -'-- ~r"',. <:.:-. .::..~~ part:/·!' (SI 237) 
_.J_ 
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On Mrs. Nelson' death, Mr. Nelson filed the present action. 
The trial was extremely brief, the entire testimony covering or.l,· 
22 pages (Transcript of Trial and Motion for New Trial, P ll-33). 
The trial was so brief because the court entirely incorporated ~~ 
domestic file which covered all of the issues except the care o: 
the home and yard given by Michelle while her mother was dying. 
Mr. Nelson sought damages as to that, which Judge Sawaya denied. 
Judge Sawaya also found: 
"3. That following the creation of the joint tenancy by 
the plaintiff Douglas A. Nelson with Betty N. Nelson, a 
divorce action was filed, and the said Betty N. Nelson, 
thereafter filed what was purported to be a notice of 
termination of joint tenancy, and also executed a Quit 
Claim Deed attempting to convey said property to ~ichel1e 
Marion Davis, however, at the time said Quit Claim Deed 
was executed the said Betty N. Nelson was under a Court 
Order not to convey said property." (T 76) 
This finding was patently erroneous. Judge Conder entered 
no order restraining the parties in regard to property in the 
October 22, 1976, hearing. The termination document was executed 
November 3, 1976. On November 4, 1976, Judge Conder's hand-
written addition to his written order specifically recognized 
that Mrs. Nelson had a right to make the termination. This was 
reaffirmed in his later order on the November 5, 1976, hearing 
(SI 182,183), and by Judge Winder in his order (SI 207-2091. 
There never was an order restrainlng ~rs. Nelson frcm cer-
minating the joint tenancy. 
-10-
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STATEMENT OF THE LAW 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
BETTY ~ELSON HAD THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE 
THE JOI~T TENfu~CY WITH OR WITHOUT LEAVE 
OF COURT UNLESS RESTRAINED BY COURT ORDER, 
AND THE ORDERS ALLOWING HER TO TERMINATE 
ARE SI~PLY JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS THAT 
SHE HAD CAUSE TO TER~INATE. 
Hamilton v. Hamilton, Utah, filed ~arch 22, 1977, case num-
ber 14456, is ln point. 
There, the husband conveyed real property which was ln his 
name alone, during the time interval between divorce trial, which 
awarded the wife a half interest in all of hls real property and 
the time the decree embodying the verbal order was signed. There 
was no existing order of court restraining the parties from dis-
poslng of their assets but the award of hal£ the property to the 
w1fe was evidence of a judical intent to that effect. 
In finding that the parties were free to dispose of assets 
unless speciflcally restrained by court order while a domestic 
action was pending, the court rev1ewed 30-3-5, UCA 1953, and held 
that: 
''It nelther authorizes nor proh1bits a party to a divorce 
action from transferring assets during the pendency of the 
proceedings. The statute spec1fically sets forth the stage 
of the proceeding aL which the court may exercise this 
discretion--and that is 'when a decree of divorce is made 
Appellunt concedes that a r~stra1n1ng order prior to trial 
Would be ~al~d. The po1nt of Hamilton is that the parties are 
-ll-
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free to act until restrained by court order. This holding is 
conclusive on Mrs. Nelson's right to terminate the joint tenancy. 
She was never restrained from so doing at any time. 
The question is whether she had cause to do so. Judge 
Conder found that she did (SI 179, 182-183). In reviewing that 
order, Judge Winder affirmed her right to terminate, and accepted 
as a fait accompli that she had done so. (SI 209) 
The domestic trial judges, Conder and Winder, had before 
them the circumstances between the parties. The entire case was 
not adjudicated due to her death, but her having good cause to 
terminate was ruled on. 
A joint tenancy, where the parties have a right of survivor· 
ship, is a close legal relationship with fiduciary characteristics 
A party is entitled to terminate a joint tenancy either by consen: 
of the other party, or by acts of the other party which are inimi-
cal to the close relationship. 14 AmJr 2d, Cotenancy and Joint 
Ownership, §15, P 108. 
Judge Conder's finding that Mrs. Nelson had the ''right" to 
terminate the joint tenancy is certainly supported by the circum-
stances of Mr. Nelson filing for divorce on finding that she had 
inoperable cancer, such filing including his attempt to evict her 
from her home, no provision for her support, and termination of 
her medical benefits. 
Sympathy must be felt for a man who has his second wife 
terminal the year after his first wife's death. However, ~r. 
-12-
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Nelson acted so entirely in his own interest, that he forced Mrs. 
Nelson to act to protect her children. If, instead, he had stood 
by her, she would never have had grounds to terminate the joint 
tenancy and the home would now be his. 
Mr. Nelson's acts of suing for annulment or divorce and 
offering the terms he offered, did not constitute the degree of 
concern for the other party's interest which characterizes a joint 
tenancy relationship. 
POINT II. 
THE ORDER OF NOVEMBER 4, 1976, AUTHORIZING 
MRS. NELSON TO TERMINATE THE JOINT TENN<CY 
WAS A FINAL ORDER, NOT APPEALED, &~D IS NOW 
RES JUDICATA. 
Usually orders made during the pendency of litigation are 
not final orders. However, when those orders have a final effect 
irrespectlve of the ultimate outcome of the case, then they are 
final and appealable at that time. 
Wheelwright v. Roman, 50 U 10, 165 P 513 
Snow v. Snow, 13 U 15, 43 P 620 
lhnnovlch ·v. Emery, 33 U 345, 93 P 988 
State v. Booth, 21 u 88, 59 P 533 
Rule 72(a),(b), URCP 
Dal·; v. Dalv, 533 P2d 884 (Utah, 1975), is a case which set 
aside a Decree of Divorce, when one party died after the decree 
was entered but before it was flnal. Daly restored the property 
awarded to the decedent by the decree back to the survivor. That 
case lS clearly distingulshable. It dealt with a JUdicial convey-
-13-
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ance of property which became a nullity on the death of a necessary! 
I 
party to the action before the order was final. 
In the case at bar, the order allowing termination of joint 
tenancy was final. Also, it did not convey property, but allowed 
a change of relationship, for the express purpose of terminating 
rights of survivorship. It dealt with the legal rights of the 
parties, but not with conveyance. 
A domestic order pendente lite which immediately and perrnan· 
ently effects property rights of the parties cannot be cured by 
appeal after a decree has been entered. For example, an order 
allowing a party to dispose of, or convert assets, is final in 
the sense that the acts will be done, positions changed, and the 
parties cannot be restored to their original position, by appeal 
of the decree after it is entered. 
The party could preserve the issue by taking an interlocuton 
appeal. Whether the interlocutory appeal is heard while the case 
is pending, or, as is often the case, the Utah supreme Court re-
serves judgment until a final decree is entered, at least the 
issue is preserved and the other party given notice. 
Mrs. Nelson had full right to rely on the final effect of 
Judge Conder's orders, as Mr. Nelson never preserved his right of 
appeal. Until her death, Mrs. Nelson acted on the basis that the 
joint tenancy was terminated, which protected her children. 
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POINT III. 
JUDGE SAWAYA DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO 
SET ASIDE ORDERS OF JUDGES OF THE SAME 
LEVEL. 
Judge Sawaya frankly and candidly admitted during the hearing 
of appellant's motion (T 73-74) in which he made his order invali-
dating the termination of joint tenancy, that he made his order 
based not so much on law as on equities. 
At that hearing, he was asked by counsel if " ... you explained 
your decision in this case by saying it was just so grossly un-
fair to Mr. Nelson to take away his half equity in the home that 
he had put a lifetime into--," and Judge Sawaya agreed that was 
the reason for his ruling. (Trial transcript P 54 L 18 55 L 10) 
Judge Sawaya had ruled, while the evidence was being present-
ed, that he would not allow evidence from appellant as to the 
equities, the questions before him being purely legal. (Trial 
transcript, P 54, L 18-23) 
No complaint is made of Judge Sawaya. On reflection, he 
followed equities rather than law. However, his change of ration-
ale did prejudice appellant because her equities had not gone into 
evidence. Thus, Judge Sawaya did not have the facts before him, 
when he ruled, that Judge Conder had. He allowed an offer of 
proof at the hearing to have him modify his order, but by that 
time he had his mind made up. 
It is always greatly appreciated by counsel when a trial 
judge candldly admits hls basls for a ruling that he makes, even 
though such might make his ruling more easy to appeal, because 
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of its assistance to counsel and the appellate court in finding 
the basis of the ruling so as to better analyze it. 
It was probably due to this equitable, rather than legal, 
basis, of Judge Sawaya's ruling, that to support it, he made the 
finding that Mrs. Nelson was under restraining order with pro-
hibited her from termination of joint tenancy. (T 76, ,13) 
Such finding was appropriate and supported by the record 
only in regard to a conveyance from Mrs. Nelson to her daughters, 
but such finding being entirely unsupported, and contrary to the 
orders of Judge Conder, in regard to termination of the joint 
tenancy. 
In effect, what Judge Sawaya did was to overrule the orders 
of Judge Conder allowing termination of the joint tenancy. 
(SI 179, 182-183) 
Judges do not have power to overrule judges of the same co~ 
and on the same level, except in clear and absolute cases of judi· 
cial error or to correct gross injustice. 
Peterson v. Peterson, 530 P2d 821 (1974) 
State v. Morgan, 527 P2d 225 (1974) 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant prays that Judge Sawaya's Order invalidating Mrs. 
Nelson's termination of joint tenancy be reversed, that such ter-
mination be recognized and the case remanded to the trial court 
for appropriate proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SAMUEL KI:·JG 
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